Macedon

Macedon is presented as the neighboring power whose ambitions repeatedly gain ground when Greek communities quarrel or their confederacies cannot act together. In the historical examples, it first turns a dispute over sacred ground into an opening for intervention, then becomes the powerful ally on whom the Achaeans rely against Sparta, only to impose its own terms. Its role in these episodes gives the essays a concrete warning: divisions within a union can invite external control, and assistance from a stronger neighbor may replace one danger with another.

Intervention in the Amphictyonic dispute

A dispute over consecrated ground at the Temple of Apollo at Delphi begins the episode. After the Phocians plough the ground, the Amphictyonic council fines them. Supported by Athens and Sparta, the Phocians refuse to comply; Thebes and other cities undertake to enforce the council’s authority. The weaker party then seeks help from Philip of Macedon, who has secretly encouraged the conflict. The dispute that might have remained an internal contest over a decree instead gives Macedon an opportunity to pursue designs against Greek liberty.

Philip uses both political maneuvering and military force. He wins popular leaders in several cities through intrigues and bribes; their influence and votes secure his admission to the Amphictyonic council. From within that body, and by force beyond it, he makes himself master of the confederacy. The sequence matters: a divided league cannot reliably enforce its own decisions, while a rival that can cultivate faction may turn the league’s institutions into a route to control.

From Greek rivalries to Macedonian ascendancy

The essays place this intervention within a wider pattern of Greek disunity. Even amid wars against Persia and Macedon, the Greek members fail to act in concert, and some are described as serving or being deceived by their common enemy. After the war with Xerxes, a proposal to expel cities judged unfaithful to the confederacy becomes another contest between Athens and Sparta over which power would retain more partisans and influence over public deliberation. The smaller members, nominally equal, have in practice become dependent on the strongest cities.

The contrast between shared victory and subsequent rivalry sharpens the warning. Athens and Sparta, inflated by success against Persia, become rivals and then enemies, doing each other more harm than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their conflict ends in the Peloponnesian War and Athens’s ruin and subjection. The essay’s argument is not that Macedonian power alone explains the Greek outcome: disunion and mutual suspicion first weaken the political ground on which Macedon can act.

The Achaean League and the price of dependence

The Achaean League initially offers a more promising alternative. Its union is more intimate and its organization wiser than the earlier confederacy; its government is associated with greater moderation and justice and less violence and sedition than in Greek cities exercising sovereignty singly. Yet this comparative strength does not make it immune to division or outside pressure. While the Amphictyonic confederacy remains, the Achaeans have little prominence; after that confederacy falls to Macedon, Philip and Alexander spare the smaller league, but later Macedonian rulers adopt a different policy.

The successors of Alexander encourage division among the Achaeans, drawing individual cities toward separate interests until the union dissolves. Some cities fall under Macedonian garrisons, while others are ruled by usurpers emerging from the disorder. As cities regain opportunities to remove their tyrants, a few reunite and others follow; the league grows to include almost the whole Peloponnese. Macedon sees this revival but is initially held back from stopping it by internal dissension. The prospect of a broader Greek union is then checked by the jealousy of Sparta and Athens toward Achaean influence.

The Achaeans, fearing Macedon, seek alliances with the kings of Egypt and Syria, rivals of the Macedonian king. Cleomenes of Sparta, ambitious and hostile to the Achaeans, attacks them and uses his influence with those rulers to break their commitments to the league. Left with the choice of submitting to Cleomenes or asking help from their former oppressor, the Achaeans choose Macedon. A Macedonian army defeats Cleomenes, but victory does not restore Achaean independence: the league’s powerful ally proves to be another name for a master. The most the Achaeans obtain through submission is permission to continue exercising their laws.

Historical warning and political significance

The account continues the pattern from dependence to renewed resistance. Philip’s later tyrannies provoke new Greek combinations, and the Achaeans join the Aetolians and Athenians in opposition. Unable to prevail, the Greeks again invite foreign arms, this time from Rome. Macedon is defeated and subdued, but the intervention does not secure the league’s freedom. Roman influence feeds internal dissension; leaders including Callicrates become instruments for misleading their fellow citizens, and appeals to separate sovereignty help draw members away from the union. In this sequence, Macedon is a recurring antagonist, but the larger lesson concerns the vulnerability created when Greek communities fail to preserve their common political purpose.

The essays use these histories to argue that confederacies are especially liable to disorder among their members, rather than simply tyranny by a central authority. Macedon’s rise illustrates how domestic disputes can be exploited from outside, how a stronger ally can become a ruler, and how the recovery of union may be undone by rivalries among its members. The examples support the broader case for a more effective union: shared political institutions must be capable of containing local conflict and resisting the interventions that division invites.